

Niederdeutsches Wort

BEITRÄGE ZUR NIEDERDEUTSCHEN PHILOLOGIE

Im Auftrag der Kommission
für Mundart- und Namenforschung Westfalens

herausgegeben von
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in Zusammenarbeit mit
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
*Schat der
Neder-duytscher spraken*

Funde niederdeutscher Forschung

Liber amicorum
für
Ludger Kremer

herausgegeben von

Tom F.H. Smits



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Eurolinguistics, European citizenship and nationalism in the Baltic Sea Region and Central Europe¹

1. Introduction

Eurolinguistics as an integral part of *Europäistik/Europeanistics*² will in the near future become a necessary complement to the monolingual programmes offered today by European schools and universities. Most of the educational programmes are not Europe-oriented and still suffer from being too limited in their national scope. What is more, they do not sufficiently consider man's great multilingual gift to acquire more than one language and more than one culture at an early age (cf. *Pushkin Thesis 1* in the Appendix). Such a one-sided monolingual view is still being propagated within a national framework through schools and universities which are not in agreement with the extensive Europeanisation and globalisation going on in economy, trade, tourism, media and electronic communication (radio, TV, Internet, etc.). The monolingual view contradicts young people's innate capacity to acquire new languages and to adapt to new cultures. In contrast to the 19th century monocultural myth embedded in the presently established national institutions, Eurolinguists claim that both new languages and new cultural patterns can be acquired much more efficiently by multilinguals than by monolinguals. Thus the whole global linguistic and cultural scenario developing everywhere in Europe and the rest of the world today in communication, trade, economy etc. also speaks for the need to reform the established educational goals of the mother-tongue type. Therefore, a radical change from the mother-tongue doctrine to the global goals of Eurolinguistics is urgently called for in order to create a framework for European linguistic diversity.

In this article, I will deal with the advantages of such a multilingual and multicultural reorientation towards thinking and acting European. However, such thinking will imply a change to a new European identity and a new kind of European citizenship not in existence today. Therefore, in order to demonstrate the need for such a European scope in describing geopolitical events and changes in Europe, I have chosen some radical semantic changes of geopolitical terms used during the 20th century. I will delve into the concepts 'Europe' and 'East Europe' during the Cold War; 'Central Europe' (*Mitteleuropa*) before and after WW II and then after 1991 (cf. Sections 3.1 and 3.2); and finally also the concepts 'European identity' and

1 This article is an enlarged version of a paper given at the Convegno internazionale *Lingue e Cittadinanza Europea* held at the University of Rome „La Sapienza“, Sept. 25-27, 2006. (See also the abridged version in *Eurolinguistics Newsweek*, No. 3, 2007).

2 For the term *Europäistik/Europeanistics* see the diagram presented to the Croatian Academy of Sciences (Oct. 2001) in URELAND (2005: 3).

‘European citizenship’, which have both undergone dramatic semantic changes since 1991 (cf. Sections 4 and 5).

Furthermore, my claim here is that only such a radical new European re-orientation along Europeanistic lines will be able to break the monopoly of national training (cf. *Pushkin Thesis 13*), because it will enable young Europeans not only to treat ‘Europe as an idea’ but also to introduce ‘European citizenship’ and ‘European identity’ as fundamental new concepts for language training and education (cf. *Pushkin Theses 8, 10*). This is not possible today with monolingual and monocultural universities and schools in Europe. Thus in order to create Europe-competent minds and to hire Europe-capable persons into the educational establishments of Europe, we need to introduce European curricula everywhere. Then European linguistic and cultural diversity can become central goals of general European education and cease being merely lipservice in the mouths of politicians. Such explicit programmes to foster a new European generation towards such a European education do not exist yet, but should be constructed according to the EU motto *Unity in Diversity*, providing for better interethnic communication with guest workers, immigrants, refugees, asylum-seekers, victims of persecution, etc. (cf. *Pushkin Thesis 19*).

2. Smaller languages, linguistic minorities and language equality

The linguistic freedom of language choice within the EU was guaranteed from the very beginning and was also supported by the introduction of a translation and interpreting service requiring more than 60 percent of all the administrative costs of the EU. However, this is the price which the EU founding fathers were prepared to pay in order to safeguard the principle of language equality and the right of language use, irrespective of the number of speakers of the European languages.

Such linguistic rights are now almost universally accepted in Europe even for minority languages spoken outside the EU administration and are regarded as part of Human Rights. *The Charter on Minority or Regional Languages* was passed by the Council of Europe in 1992, and improvements and confirmations were added later for individuals, minorities, nations and peoples by The Vienna Follow-up Meeting of 1986-89 and the Copenhagen Meeting of 1990 and the treaty of Maastricht of 1991. In this way, linguistic rights and linguistic equality are legally and politically firmly guaranteed within the European Union.

This general recognition of linguistic rights by the great majority of the members of the Council of Europe will in 2007 include all 11 „old“ and the 12 „new“ enlargement languages plus possibly Turkish on Cyprus later on, to which we must also add all the minority languages and regional languages, also protected and safeguarded by the 1992 Charter (cf. Tables 1a and 1b).

Through the 2004 accession of nine new enlargement languages plus three additional languages in 2007 as official EU languages, we will have a huge European block of 23 languages in 27 member states almost 500 million speakers who speak

either major or minority languages. The number of minority speakers is estimated at 50 million, which includes e.g. Sámi in Scandinavia, Low German, Frisian and Sorbian in Germany etc.

| <i>Eurolinguistics South</i> | <i>Eurolinguistics North</i> | <i>Eurolinguistics West</i> |
|--|------------------------------|-----------------------------|
| Portuguese, Spanish, Italian, French, Greek | Danish, Swedish, Finnish | English, Dutch, German |

Table 1a: The „old“ EU languages before 2004

| <i>The Baltic States</i> | <i>Eurolinguistics Centre</i> | <i>Eurolinguistics South</i> | <i>Eurolinguistics West</i> |
|-------------------------------|---|--|-----------------------------|
| Estonian, Latvian, Lithuanian | Polish, Czech, Slovak, Hungarian, Slovenian | Romanian (2007), Bulgarian (2007), Maltese (2004) (Turkish on Cyprus) ³ | Irish (2007) ⁴ |

Table 1b: The enlargement-languages of 2004-2007 in the Baltic States, Central Europe and South-Eastern Europe

The great task is now to find a way to promote and protect the cultural and linguistic use of all the small national languages,⁵ and even more so of the minority languages in order to reach the goals of linguistic equality. Such liberal legislation is very important for maintaining diversity because it requires freedom of speech and writing, whether it is a majority or a minority language used by an individual or a group. Such linguistic freedom will hopefully create a completely new Europe-wide willingness among young people to learn other European languages for the benefit of mobility, because foreign language competence is often a requirement for getting a new job. Foreign languages are also obligatory in the pursuit of education abroad and in service careers within the EU. Therefore, courses on foreign languages and citizen cultures are in most immigration countries obligatory and are offered to new-

3 Turkish can become an additional official EU language as soon as the Turkish-occupied part of Cyprus is reunited with the Republic of Cyprus. However, the overall position and problem of Turkish as an official language within the EU will have to be resolved later.

4 Up to 2007, Irish had only the status of a „treaty language“ and only certain fundamental documents were translated into Irish. In 2007, it became an official EU language but with a transitory period of adaptation because of limited translation and interpreting resources within the EU.

5 See, however, FENNELL's criticism of the EU language policy regarding the promotion of lesser-used languages such as Irish and other minority languages: „the Charter does not propose that states make an effort to discover what are the will and intentions of the defined languages [the minority languages, P.S.U] with respect to their languages“ (cf. FENNELL 2003: 34).

comers for assimilation and national citizenship. Multilingualism as an accepted goal of European education will thus help to foster the aforementioned new feeling of European togetherness and European identity (cf. *Pushkin Theses* 7, 8).


The openness and free choice of languages implied in the EU recommendations and its conventions is a unique characteristic because each member state decides when it applies for EU membership which language(s) will be registered as official language(s). In the official EU list of the member state languages, at least one of the national languages is registered.

3. Languages and European citizenship

3.1 'East Europe' and 'Central Europe' (*Mitteleuropa*) as geopolitical concepts

After this survey of the rights of use and equality of major and minor European languages and the status of lesser-used languages as safeguarded or protected minority or regional languages, we turn to the problem of language and citizenship in the eastern part of the Baltic Sea Region after the end of the Second World War (cf. Map 1). The political events of 1989-90 caused a veritable change of European identity in that the idea of Europe ceased to be only a cultural and economic concept limited to western Europe as it was during the Cold War. It became a new *Mega-Europe* with its new Europe-wide exercises in political and economic engineering such as the Coal and Steel Community (CECA) in 1951/1952, the EEC (European Economic Community) in 1957/1958, „The First Rome Treaty“, and, in the same year, EURATOM, „The Second Rome Treaty“. Finally, in 1993, the European Union (EU) was created through the fusion of the three treaties.

However, after the 1989-90 upheavals in Communist-ruled 'East Europe' which can be classified as a true revolution – in the classical Marxist sense also – the political and ethnic map of eastern Europe had to be radically redrawn after the declaration of independence of a number of East Block States: Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania (the Baltic States) in 1990-91, Bela Rus', the Ukraine and Moldova and finally the dramatic dissolution of the Soviet Union before Christmas 1991. (Compare Map 1 with Map 2).




Map 1: 1991: The Baltic States and central Europe after the Fall of the Berlin Wall (1989)

3.2 The Cold War, lesser-used languages and linguistic domination in ‚East Europe‘

The Iron Curtain had fallen and with the end of the Cold War a totally new political and economic situation in the Baltic Sea Region had arisen (cf. Map 1), which also had ethnic and linguistic consequences for the peoples of ‚East Europe‘ behind the former Iron Curtain, running over sea and land through the Baltic and Adriatic Seas and from Lübeck in the north to Trieste in the south between 1945-1991. Suddenly the designation „East Europe“ became outdated, and the old concept and name „Mitteleuropa“ resurfaced as a ghost from pre-First World War times which was more associated with the peoples, languages and countries of the Old Austro-Hungarian Empire (cf. Map 4). The destruction of East Europe after the two world wars was


tremendous⁶ and there was a longing back to a return of history, back to the pre-war geopolitical situation. The change from a universalist, anti-national Soviet Communism to a particularistic national ideology was the response among the populations of the Baltic States, Czechoslovakia and the states of ex-Communist Yugoslavia (e.g. Slovenia, Croatia etc.). The resurgence of the old name „Mitteleuropa“ for these states is a means of re-Europeanisation to reintroduce some of the values and aspirations eliminated earlier by the Soviet system (cf. SCHÖPFLIN 1989: 27).



6 Cf. NAWRATIL (2005: 23-160) and NAIMARK (2004: 139-172) and the TV-film *Die Flucht* (2007) by Kai Wessel (producer) and Gabriela Sperrl (play-wright) which shows the consequences of a total break-down of civil and military organisation due to the Russian offensive in East Prussia in the winter of 1944-45 when ca. two million refugees succumbed to the endurances of the forced evacuation of the former German eastern provinces of East Prussia, Pommerania, Silesia etc.

Against the backdrop of this geopolitical scenario caused by the 1989-91 Revolution in Europe, there was a wave of ethnolinguistic nationalism sweeping the new free Baltic and Central European countries, which caused the political borders to be re-drawn according to the dominant ethnolinguistic situation of pre-WW II Europe (cf. Map 1 and Map 3). This second break-up of Europe in 1989-90 brought a new idea of Europe in its wake, and a new ethnolinguistic awakening similar to the World War I break-up was the result. There arose new ethnic states with language as the defining characteristic, so that the number of European states had almost doubled to 43 between 1924 and 2006, including here Monte Negro and the new eastern European states after the dissolution of the Soviet Union and former Yugoslavia (cf. CARR 1945: 24 and *Taschen Atlas* 2005: 180-181). The nostalgia for the *ancien régime* of pre-war Europe saw the restoration of the name and concept „Mitteleuropa“. The preceding designation „East Europe“ of the years between 1945 and 1991

became obsolete because of its smack of the Cold War division of Europe.



Map 3: 1921-1938: The Baltic States and Central Europe after WW I and before WW II

It was the Russian-speaking Red Army that had brought Communism to Central Europe and with it Russian as a second state language (e.g. in Lithuania, Latvia and Estonia) or as a first foreign language at the expense of the smaller East European languages after 1945. The linguistic domination by the Russian language in the East Block is thus a consequence of the political division of Europe into a reduced 'Western Europe' under the American protective shield and an expanded 'East Europe' under Soviet-Russian domination. The Cold War can thus be seen as a battle between two opposed civilisations: the Christian identity of the West versus the Atheist-Communist East, symbolised militarily by NATO (1949) and the Warsaw Pact (1955) respectively.

3.3 Nationality and European citizenship

3.3.1 *The European idea and identity from 1945-1989*

In his provocative book, Gerald DELANTY (1995: 115-129) discusses the development of „the idea of Europe“ since the end of World War II. He calls Europe after 1945 a „Cold War Construction“ which is regarded as „a cultural idea based on geopolitical unity“, whereas the rise of the concept 'European identity' is a new phenomenon.

The two new concepts – 'Europe as an idea' and 'European identity' – are of great importance, because they are of relevance in discussing 'European citizenship' and the role which the European *Sprach- und Kulturgemeinschaft* play as basic components in creating a feeling of European togetherness and European consciousness (cf. *Pushkin Theses* 7, 8, 10).

In this context I would like to refer to the use of 'Europe' and 'The Cold War' among some guest workers in Germany in 1983 who said to me:

- (1) Europa ist unsere Heimat.
- (2) The Cold War is there to keep the Americans in, the Russians out and the Germans down.

In utterance (1), which was expressed by an immigrated South-European guest worker in Heidelberg, 'Europe' meant 'Europe West'. Through the opinion expressed in (2), which was also widespread in Germany during the 1960s and 1970s, we get evidence of the political and economic role which *The Cold War* was thought to play in Post-World War II Germany. Both expressions referred to a 'Europe' of new contents and a politically incorrect view of 'The Cold War', especially after the building of the Berlin Wall in the divided territory of Germany.

If we use the two utterances exemplified here we have a good clue for understanding the more recent change of the concept 'Europe' which is also due to political and economic changes and which we are witnessing today before our very eyes after the 1989-1990 Revolution and after the period of recent European enlargements, when 'Europe' again is going through a new and a much wider geopolitical

meaning, including former Communist-ruled territories in the former East Block also.

Our more modern concept of 'Europe as an economic and geopolitical unity' is growing more and more, which is directly correlated with the growth of its geographical space and the number of new members since the First Rome Treaty of 1957. There was a true longing for peace after the Second European Thirty-Years'-War between 1914 and 1945. The destruction of Central European culture and civilisation was enormous. The 20th century became the bloodiest century in history. It is estimated that more than 60 million people were killed or displaced in less than a decade between 1939-1948 in „Mitteleuropa“. MAGOCSI mentions the total number of 15,4 million displaced persons (DPs) who were temporarily or permanently resettled between 1939 and 1943, during the first five years of World War II.

This wartime-planned demographic change intensified at the end of 1943 and was even doubled after the end of the war and during the first years of peace between 1944 and 1948 so that an additional 31,1 million displaced persons were transferred due to expulsion, which meant a collapse of the ethnic and linguistic structures of the whole area of Central Europe. This enormous ethnic and linguistic catastrophe unseen in European history before has still not been overcome today.⁷ The wounds of such ethnic cleansing and forced migrations are not healed and will not heal for generations.⁸ Furthermore, as far as the linguistic maps of eastern and central Europe are concerned, i.e. those of the German- and Polish-speaking populations in particular, but also those of the Balkan peoples, they will have to be completely redrawn.⁹


Ethnic and linguistic borders had already been radically changed after the First World War, most often according to the victors' arbitrary whims and to the detriment of those defeated. Migrations of millions of refugees had resulted from the dissolution of the two former Central European empires – the Austro-Hungarian

7 Cf. MAGOCSI (2002: 190-193) who presents figures of population transfers in tens of millions between 1939-1943 and 1944-1948 together with a map of population movements 1943-1948 in Central Europe, the so-called *Bevölkerungskarussell* 'the population merry-go-round'. See also NAWRATIL (2005) and NAIMARK (2004: 77-106; 139-172).

8 Cf. e. g. the ethnic and linguistic description of East Prussia after WW II by VORONKOVA (2007).

9 Cf. esp. NAIMARK (2005: 185-194) on nationalistic fanaticism and ethnic cleansing in ex-Yugoslavia during the 1980s and the wars of the 1990s in Bosnia and Kosovo (pp. 194-218) and also the language maps of the Baltic States (p. 2067); Poland (p. 2039); Czech Republic (p. 2043); eastern Germany: East and West Prussia (p. 2039); and Silesia (p. 2039) and those of former Yugoslavia (p. 2025) published in GOEBL et al. (1997: 1981-2006), where completely new geographical distributions of East- and Central-European languages can be seen with only small remainders of the former German-speaking territories and linguistic islands in between.

Empire and the Second German Wilhelmenian Empire – but also those of Eastern Europe such as the Russian Empire of the Romanovs and the Ottoman Empire.¹⁰



Map 4: 1914: The Baltic States and Central Europe before WW I

Likewise, the fall of the Third German Reich of the Nazis after the Second World War and the subsequent expansion of the Soviet Empire after 1945 were to cause even larger population movements and killings between 1939 and 1948.

The ensuing political, economic, ethnic but also linguistic consequences of the two world wars are still visible in Central Europe and in the territories occupied by the former Soviet Union. As a consequence, there was among the founding fathers

10 Cf. Map 4, which shows the geopolitical situation before the break-up of the Central European Empires (Germany and Austria-Hungary) through the Peace Treaty of Versailles in 1919 and also Tsarist Russia before the Russian Revolution.

of the European idea of today, a great need of overcoming this vicious circle of nationalism, wars, population transfers, ethnic cleansing and systematic extinction. They wanted to overcome radical nationalism with its nationalistic concepts of fatherland, nation, race, Muttersprache etc. by introducing a new idea of Europe which was based on democratic ideals with respect to human rights, tolerance, equality and civil rights coined during the French and American revolutions. Western politicians such as Schuman and Monet (France), Adenauer (West Germany), di Gasperi (Italy) etc. were the architects in creating the new idea of Europe in this sense in order to replace the older fascist and racist concept of Europe and to solve the problem of the division of Germany and also that of Europe. 'Europe' as an economic-geographical entity was discovered and the so-called „Free Europe“ west of the Soviet occupied areas became the bridgehead for this new idea of a 'free and democratic Europe'.

The development of 'the smaller European idea' in the sense of a 'non-Soviet and non-Communist ruled Europe West' was to begin with only six members: Belgium, France, West Germany, Luxembourg, Italy and the Netherlands. One can claim this early European idea to be a result of the Cold War. It was „Little Europe“ in the west under military control and protection of the western Allies (NATO), especially that of the United States. The American economic, military, political, cultural and, last but not least, linguistic influence was so dominant that the expressions *Amerope* and *Euro-America* were coined cf. (e.g. FENNELL 2003). It was, however, a European unity of national but independent democratic states which were attracted to forming the new European unity and not a unity dominated by old-age revanchism. The Iron Curtain also inadvertently became a bulwark against the Red Army and a guarantee of US hegemony and protection in the west, as well as in order to prevent the rise of a *Fourth German Reich*. It also separated Europe into two economic blocks, that of the free market (Capitalism) and that of planned economy (Socialism).

3.3.2 *Europe as idea and identity after 1989-90*

The idea of 'Europe after 1989-90' has, to a very large extent, become a collective concept for vague ideas but which all stress the common cultural and linguistic aspects of Europe, which in German is called the *Europäische Sprach- und Kulturgemeinschaft*. The notion of geo-political unity is implied but under the prospect of necessary modernisation. Through the most recent enlargements of the EU in 2004 and 2007 a new and greater European unity of almost 500 million inhabitants and language speakers will be created. It will lead to a major economic, political and ethnic confrontation between the „Fortress of Europe“ and the rest of the world, unless adequate measures are taken for defusing the threatening ethnic and linguistic bomb, depending on what kind of geopolitical Europe is being projected and what kind of post-national Europe will appear in the future. The risk of xenophobic nationalism and racist reaction is prevalent, which is clearly visible in the guest worker

legislation within the EU and in laws against uncontrolled immigration from other continents (North Africa, Near East and South-East Asia).

The key issue in this xenophobic development is the question of linguistic and cultural tests of prospective immigrants and their competence to be naturalised in the EU countries. The sovereign nation-states which regulate the admission of immigration and citizenship have the freedom to decide which immigrants are permitted or rejected on judicial and linguistic grounds. After the fall of the Iron Curtain and the fall of a Europe divided between the East and the West by the Cold War, we have a new type of Europe which is part of the larger global confrontation between the North and the South. This is a completely new idea for the identity of Europe and its geopolitical situation after the Revolution of 1989-90.

4. Nationality and citizenship in Europe

Since the 1989-90 Revolution we have thus been confronted with a cleft between universalism embodied by the European Union on the one hand, and particularism by the nation-states on the other, whereby the latter is supported by the national languages and cultures. From the very beginning after the foundation of the EU in 1957, the national language criterion and birth were the main factors for assigning nationality status to the dominant ethnic group of a new EU-member. By doing so, the EU became a system of nation-states in which problems arose in assigning citizenship to those national minorities who did not belong to the major ethnic populations and who spoke minority languages. There are well-known aspects of this dilemma in the Baltic States, where the Russian-speaking population cannot attain citizenship unless they speak, write and understand Estonian, Latvian or Lithuanian. Similar hindrances are raised for national minorities (Turks, Iranians, Kurds, North African Muslims etc.) having immigrated to the major EU-countries, e.g. Germany, France, Italy, Spain, Great Britain etc. where different kinds of language and culture tests are used for granting residence permits or assigning citizenship. The nationality stamp in the passports of these European immigrants is thus a precarious criterion for assigning citizenship in the country of arrival, aside from the criterion of language and cultural knowledge of the host country. Arbitrary language tests are therefore used to find out whether the applicant possesses a sufficient degree of linguistic and cultural competence.

However, such tests are so constructed that most of the minority speakers cannot pass them or do not want to take the tests. As far as applying for European citizenship is concerned, it is only possible to become eligible for it by passing the nationality test of the specific nation-state,¹¹ provided the state of immigration is a member of the EU. *No direct application to the EU is possible!*

11 In the Treaty of Maastricht (1994) it was stipulated that „Every person holding the nationality of a Member State shall be a citizen of the Union“ (Articles 17-22). It is also explicitly stated that „Citizenship of the Union shall complement and not replace national

An improvement of this situation would be to grant the linguistic and cultural minorities from other areas than the EU a possibility of applying for citizenship directly to the EU, which would be a decisive step in fulfilling the idea of Europe as a unity, based on the EU principle of being a geopolitical territory consisting of independent nation-states with a *plurality of languages and cultures* and not on *monolingual ethnic majority blocks* like the nation-states. If it were possible to request European citizenship directly from the EU and not via the nation-states, the EU would send out a clear signal that it accepts and safeguards multilingual and multicultural entities within its territory. This is what would lead to a *post-national European citizenship* in the sense of DELANTY (1995: 159-160). In order to understand the line of argumentation here, it is necessary to discuss the relationship between nationality and citizenship from a historical point of view.

5. The historical background of citizenship

Thus, instead of using the nationality criteria (birth and mother tongue) as a basis for admission to European citizenship, DELANTY (1995) suggests a territorial criterion in that such admission should be based on the geographical presence in the EU together with the experience of the European city culture of the past, i.e.

the secular and pluralist traditions of the European cities and the earlier traditions associated with them. (ibid.: 159-160)

He refers to Human Rights as formulated by the French and American Revolutions (civil rights, liberty, free political activities, right to welfare etc.). According to him the pluralist idea and autonomy of the city is a much more adequate starting point for building a new Europe than the tyranny of centralised power (cf. BENEVOLO 1993). The potentiality of the larger city promises such a renewal and new sources of initiatives to combat the tribalism of new pseudo-nationalism within the EU and the existing norms of European identity (cf. CASTELLS 1994).

5.1 Political-semantic change of citizenship

However, the very use of the term „citizenship“ today is historically false because it is linked to the nation-state as a given territory with civil rights and a constitution. This goes back to the misguided belief since 19th century romanticism that constitutional and civil rights can only be guaranteed within the limits of the Nation State (DELANTY 1995: 160). Therefore the overriding task now is to use the term „citizenship“ in its original historical sense, but not as referring to a certain ‚citizenship in a given city‘ but to ‚citizenship in the European Union‘. By doing so we would gain a deeper and broader perspective of the individual person as it was during the early

citizenship“ (idem). The latter statement cements the requirement of national membership and precludes a direct application by non-EU-members and non-Europeans.

French Revolution, in which the „citoyens“ preached radical democracy and self-determinism for the individuals as citizens responsible for a democratic polity which was opposed to a coercive, totalitarian state and which were liberated from the whims of a monarch and the dogmas of the church. This older meaning of ‚citizenship‘ in the sense of ‚popular sovereignty‘ has been lost today, because it was seen by the 19th century State as „negative liberty“ after the excesses of the French Revolution and the dictatorial Napoleonic period. The change of „citizenship“ to „nationality“ came about during the national-romantic 19th century as an arbitrary incursion of the State.

5.2 Post-national citizenship and European citizenship

Instead of tying citizenship to specific national belonging, DELANTY proposes creating a *post-national kind of citizenship* with reference to ANDREWS (1991), HABERMAS (1992), MEEHAN (1993b), VOGEL (1991) etc. The problem is that in the constitution of modern states there is no clear distinction between citizenship and patriotism. The citizen is transformed into the patriot (cf. DELANTY 1995:166). Universal rights of citizenship have thus been subordinated to particularism of nationality, whereby privileges of birth, blood and property relations of bourgeois society are decisive criteria of national membership in the State. This political-semantic change was possible due to the changed criteria of selection for citizenship during the 19th century, which led to a reduction of the concept of the citizenship in the sense of radical democracy and self-determinism during the French Revolution to the later meaning of nationality. The danger of the change discussed here is that citizenship is being reduced to national chauvinism of the new nations, e.g. the 25 million Russians now living with no clear rights of citizenship outside the Russian Federal Republic who are now objects of nationalistic persecution and have become more or less stateless without civil rights and passports.

6. Conclusion

In order to sum up the contents of this article, it is necessary to claim that European identity is trapped in a racial myth of origins derived from 19th century romantic nationalism about race, language and culture. The prevailing ideas of assimilation of ethnic and linguistic minorities (immigrants, refugees, asylum seekers, stateless persons etc.) are mostly directed towards integration of such minorities into the majority matrix of the dominant cultures and languages of Europe. The attempt of such vast integration has turned out to be a failure (cf. e.g. the recent riots of 2005-2006 in the suburbs of Paris, Marseille, Lyon etc., the North African guest worker problems in southern Spain or the economic migrants from West Africa to the Ca-

nary Islands,¹² and last but not least the endless stream of guest workers from Eastern Europe etc.). If you are an immigrant to the EU you have to become a national of the country where you land by chance. Thus, there is a very strong connection between nationality and citizenship. If we now try to look upon European citizenship as an international concept which transcends the particularist national assumptions of language, culture and birth, treating European citizenship as determined by residence/territory and not by birth or nationality, we will create a completely new situation for those 64 million already living as immigrants in Europe who are looking for a new *Heimat* (cf. the utterance above: „Europa ist unsere Heimat“).

These masses of immigrants in an incessant stream to Europe since the 1960s are knocking on the doors of the European Union to be let in and to become Europeans. They are escaping from starvation, civil wars, poverty, political and religious persecution, illness, threat of brutality and torture. They have the ring of life, freedom, democracy, welfare etc. in their ears. They dare to risk their lives in crossing deserts, open seas and climbing fences of barbed-wire which separate their habitats from the „Fortress of Europe“. With their feet they vote for a new life in Europe by leaving their home countries, languages and cultures to become Europeans. Since the nation-state and nationality is the basis of European citizenship, they are forced to apply for national membership within the European countries where they are legal or illegal guest workers, asylum seekers or normal immigrants. Although they are normal human beings, they can only be accepted as equal human beings and Europeans after they have applied for national membership in the nation-states and can thus only indirectly become European citizens. That is, only after having received a stamp of nationality in their passports can they indirectly obtain European citizenship. This is a vicious nationalistic circle of discrimination against the civil rights of immigrants to Europe and between European countries. DELANTY (1995) suggests that the present-day practice of membership application via the nation-states should be replaced by a much more open concept for obtaining European citizenship, that is, not applying via national membership but as free individuals directly to the higher administration of the European Union. He calls this European membership POST-NATIONAL CITIZENSHIP, which is unrestrictive in the sense of the Revolutionary French concept of „citoyen“. The post-national citizenship can thus be linked to cultural pluralism and block the racist concept of nationality. Such a step will create a new European identity which will open the gates to immigrants to enjoy the right to life, freedom, democracy and civil rights. Only in this way can they as individuals obtain European citizenship and become members of a new „Heimat“: Europa.

12 Cf. e.g. the detailed description of the five-year-odyssey from Ghana via Togo, Nigeria, Niger, Mali, Senegal, Mauretania, Sahara, Morocco, and back via Algeria, the Sahara and Nigeria to Ghana in BRINKBAUMER (2006).

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APPENDIX

1. *The Pushkin Theses:*

Pushkin Thesis 1: Departing from the insight that man is endowed with a *faculté du langage* that is not of a monolingual but a multilingual nature, Eurolinguistics places the multilingual individual in the centre of research.¹³

Pushkin Thesis 7: Such insight into the common linguistic and cultural basis of European languages will foster a sense of European togetherness.

Pushkin Thesis 8: Such feeling of European belonging together, from ancient to modern times, will help create a European identity which is still lacking even among the younger generations.

Pushkin Thesis 10: A sense of European identity based on insights into the common European linguistic and cultural heritage will help to block the growth of extremist national movements and ethnic discrimination.

Pushkin Thesis 13: Eurolinguistics as an integral part of a new interdisciplinary branch of the humanities – European studies (*Europäistik*) – with the aim of promoting a European-minded programme in the education of young Europeans from primary schools to universities.

Pushkin Thesis 19: Research projects and possibly research centres on multilingualism and Eurolinguistics should be founded in European countries where such projects and institutions do not exist, and where the assimilation of immigrant minorities is an issue called for to foster a feeling of Europe as our „Heimat“, especially among the younger generations of the migrated guest workers.

2. Geopolitical Maps of central and eastern Europe 1914-1991

Maps 1-4 are reproduced from information material distributed at the Museum of Occupation in Riga, Latvia, Summer 2006.

¹³ The Pushkin Theses were formulated for the Second International Eurolinguistics Symposium held in Pushkin, Russia in 1999 and published in the proceedings (cf. URELAND 2003: 25-26).

